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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines whether market evaluates merger announcements in a reasonable 
way based on their effect on fundamental value using a sample of 37 mergers from U.S. 
industries completed within 1992-1997. For this purpose, the postmerger performance 
measures were regressed by abnormal returns at the announcement period. The research 
findings provide partial support to market efficiency hypothesis. Full sample analysis shows 
that bidder abnormal stock return at the merger announcement is a good predictor of the 
postmerger cash flow changes, whereas subsample analyses yield varying results that cast 
doubt to market efficiency. The variation of the findings across subsamples suggests that the 
market sticks to its dynamic clichés in the evaluating merger’s future success in the 
environment of asymmetric information and these clichés sometimes incorporate misleading 
information content. 
Key Words:  Mergers, Market Efficiency, Abnormal Returns, Event Studies,  
   Asymmetric Information 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Market efficiency hypothesis state that the information that the market uses to determine 
security prices includes all information available and the market understands the implication 
of the available information for the security prices (Fama, 1976). Therefore, prices “fully 
reflect” available information in efficient markets. Efficient market hypothesis can be tested 
through several ways where mergers are one of the alternatives.  
Mergers have two implications for the tests of market efficiency. First, semistrong form 
of market efficiency implies that prices will adjust immediately to the announcement of 
mergers. Financial literature have thoroughly investigated this hypothesis and concluded that 
market reacts instantaneously to merger announcements. The overwhelming majority of the 
researches provide evidence that targets of successful mergers earn significantly positive 
abnormal returns on the announcement of the offers, whereas the returns to acquirers are on 
average zero (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1983; Desai and Kim, 
1988; Nathan and O’Keefe, 1989). 
Second implication of the merger announcements for market efficiency lies in the 
informational content of merger announcements. If the market is efficient, it is supposed that 
market’s reaction to merger announcements reflects the expected synergetic gains from 
mergers. That is market should react positively (via higher positive abnormal returns) to 
mergers that create synergy and react negatively (via lower abnormal returns) to mergers that 
postmerger destroy shareholders’ value.  
If the market predicts synergetic gains from mergers properly, then second question 
should be answered: How the market determines the success of mergers? Since the market do 
not have an access to the private valuation of bidder and targets in the merger process, they 
may utilize the characteristics of merger announcements as a signal about the success of 
merger. Financial literature provide evidence that market uses method of payment, business 
overlap of merging firms and the degree of valuation of merging firms by market in the 
determination of direction and magnitude of market’s reaction to merger announcements 
(Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1987), Huang and Walkling (1987), Rau and Vermaelen 
(1995)). 
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In this study, I test market efficiency hypothesis which assert that market’s reaction to 
the merger announcement is the predictor of the postmerger performance improvements using 
a sample of 37 mergers between U.S. public industrial firms completed between 1992 and 
19971. The postmerger performance measures were regressed by abnormal returns at the 
announcement period to test market efficiency hypothesis. I also test the strength of market 
efficiency hypothesis across subsamples defined according to business overlap degree of 
mergers, method of payment, bidder’s price to book ratio compared to industry’s median 
value and combined merger size.  
My research findings provide partial support to market efficiency hypothesis. Full 
sample analysis shows that bidder abnormal stock return at the merger announcement is a 
good predictor of the postmerger cash flow changes, whereas target abnormal stock returns at 
the merger announcement are not determined by expectations about postmerger performance 
improvements. Despite of strong results for full sample, subsample analyses yielded varying 
results that cast doubt to market efficiency. Apparently, stock markets are able somewhat 
perfectly to predict postmerger cash flow changes through bidder abnormal returns in the 
merger announcements in half of the subsets, whereas it mistakes in remaining half. Stock 
markets react properly to the cash and mixed-financed, high overlap, value, and small merger 
subsets. In these subsamples, the explained variability in postmerger cash flow changes by 
abnormal bidder returns in the merger announcements range from 76 to 87 percent, which is 
extremely strong. However, stock markets are not reacting properly to the merger 
announcements in the equity-financed, low and medium overlap, growth and big mergers. 
The variation of the findings across subsamples suggests that the market sticks to its dynamic 
clichés in the evaluating merger’s future success in the environment of asymmetric 
information and these clichés sometimes incorporate misleading information content. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes sample and data 
used in the study. Section III studies postmerger performance improvements. Section IV 
analyzes market reaction to merger announcements. Section V tests whether market reaction 
to merger announcements predict properly postmerger performance improvements. Section 
VI gives a brief conclusion. 
 
                                                 
1 I end my time period in 1997 year since postmerger performance analysis requires three-year postmerger 
analysis window.  
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II. SAMPLE AND DATA 
I collected a sample of mergers between 1992 and 1997. The source of the merger data 
is Mergerstat. The primary database consists of 629 merger bids meeting the below-
mentioned restrictions; 
1. There is a merger offer to purchase stock in the company.  
2. The details of the offer appear in Mergerstat.  
3. Transaction date lies between 1992 and 1997.  
4. Transactions valued at less than $ 350 million were eliminated. Banks, insurance, 
and railroad companies were eliminated, since they are subject to different 
regulations.  
5. Country of bidders and targets is USA. Acquisitions by foreign concerns were 
eliminated.  
6. The deals that did not obtain complete ownership of the target were eliminated.  
7. The mergers that were later cancelled were eliminated. 
From this primary database I select my sample according to the following criteria:  
8. The acquiring company is required to have at least, three years premerger and 
postmerger financial and market data available on the Compustat tapes, whereas 
the requirement for the target company is three years premerger financial and 
market data.  
9. The size of target should exceed 5% of the size of acquirer. Target firm size is 
computed from Compustat as the market value of common stock plus the net 
debt and preferred stock at the beginning of the year before the acquisition.  
10. Some companies are involved in more than one merger bid. The merger cases 
involving these bidder firms are eliminated from the analysis, since there are 
distorting effects of crossing merger cases. 
These selection criteria reduce my initial sample of 629 merger cases to 56. Summary 
statistics for aggregate, average, and median deal size and total number of mergers according 
to calendar years in 56 merger cases are reported in Table 1. The last two years capture more 
than half of the total number and aggregate dollar value of mergers. Average deal size is 
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2,983 million dollars, whereas median deal size is 1,169 million dollars. The average and 
median deal size suggests that the study is focused on larger mergers.  
TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics for Aggregate, Average, and Median Deal Size and Total Number of Mergers 
According to Calendar Years in 56 Merger Cases over the Period 1992-1997. 
Year Total  
Number of 
Mergers 
Aggregate Deal 
Size  
(Million Dollars) 
Average Deal Size 
(Million Dollars) 
Median Deal Size 
(Million Dollars) 
1992 3 1,222 407 406 
1993 6 14,213 2,369 1,154 
1994 5 4,410 882 828 
1995 13 46,607 3,585 1,440 
1996 15 83,735 5,582 2,184 
1997 14 16,872 1,205 772 
Total 56 167,059 2,983 1,169 
The source of the financial and market data is Compustat.  
 
III.  SYNERGETIC GAINS FROM MERGERS  
In this section, I do not intend to conduct full postmerger performance analysis. I am 
more concerned with partial analysis which focuses on whether there are postmerger 
performance improvements in terms of only cash flows. For this purpose, I construct 
experimental design and test my hypothesis with nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test.  
 
3.1. Methodology 
In this study, I use EBITD deflated by the market value of equity to measure 
improvements in operating performance. I define EBITD, measured over the year, as sales, 
minus cost of goods sold and selling and administrative expenses, plus depreciation and 
goodwill expenses. This measure excludes the effect of depreciation, goodwill, interest 
expense and income, and taxes. It is therefore unaffected by the method of accounting for the 
merger (purchase or pooling accounting) and the method of financing (cash, mixed or equity). 
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As discussed in Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992), these factors make it difficult to compare 
traditional accounting returns of the merged firm over time and cross-sectionally. 
I exclude the change in equity values of the target and acquiring firms at the merger 
announcement from the asset base in the postmerger years. For the target and acquirer, the 
change in equity values is measured on the beginning of the month before the bid offer is 
announced to the date the target is deleted from Compustat, which is regarded as the delisting 
date from trading on public exchanges. In an efficient stock market these revaluations 
represent the capitalized value of any expected postmerger performance improvements. If 
merger announcement equity revaluations are included in the asset base, measured cash flow 
returns will not show any abnormal increase, even though the merger results in an increase in 
operating cash flows.  
I aggregate performance data of the target and bidding firms before the merger to obtain 
the premerger performance measures of the combined firms. In the calculation of variables 
for premerger years, EBITD and market value of equity are taken as the sum of the values for 
the target and acquiring firms. The variable values of surviving firm are used in the 
postmerger years. 
Comparing the postmerger performance with this premerger benchmark provides a 
measure of the change in the performance. But economic factors have much effect on the 
postmerger performance of the merged firms and some of the difference between the 
premerger and postmerger performance could be due to economywide and industry factors, 
prior to a continuation of firm-specific performance before the merger. Hence, I use abnormal 
industry-adjusted performance of the target and bidding firms as my primary benchmark to 
evaluate postmerger performance. 
My tests, therefore, control for these factors by comparing sample firms’ performance 
with their surrounding industries’. Abnormal industry-adjusted performance is calculated by 
subtracting the industry median from the sample firm value for each year and firm. I use 
Compustat SIC industry definitions, and exclude the target and acquiring firms’ values from 
the industry median computations. Industry values for the sample firms are constructed by 
weighing median performance measures for the target and acquiring firms’ industries by the 
relative asset sizes of bidder and target at the beginning year of the merger announcement. 
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To test for the research prediction, I first compute empirical proxies for every company 
for a seven-year period: three years before through three years after mergers. I then calculate 
the median of each variable for each firm over pre- and postmerger windows (premerger= 
years –3 to –1; postmerger = years +1 to +3). Year 0, the year of the merger, is excluded from 
the analysis since the variable values for this year are not comparable across firms.  
Having computed industry-adjusted pre- and postmerger medians, I use the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test as my principal method of testing for significant changes in the variables. I 
base my conclusions on the standardized test statistic Z, which for samples of at least 10 
follows approximately a standard normal distribution. In addition to the Wilcoxon test, I use a 
(binomial) proportion test to determine whether the proportion (p) of firms experiencing 
changes in a given direction is greater than would be expected by chance (typically testing 
whether p = 0.5). Given the wide variance in firms, and industries, finding that an 
overwhelming proportion of firms changed performance in the same direction may be at least 
as informative as a finding concerning the median change in performance. 
In addition to analyzing the full sample of merged companies, I perform similar tests for 
below mentioned subsamples. 
i) Business Overlap Subsamples: Theoretical financial literature suggests that 
strategy is an important determinant of the improvements in the postmerger 
performance, therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that mergers by firms 
that have overlapping businesses will show greater cash flow improvements 
than mergers between firms with no overlap. I examine this proposition by 
classifying my sample mergers as those with high, medium, and low business 
overlap between the target and acquiring firms. High overlap mergers are 
merger cases between those bidder and target firms whose at least three first 
SIC Code numbers are the same, whereas in medium overlap mergers the first 
two SIC Code numbers similar, remaining mergers are classified as low 
overlap mergers. Sample analysis show that 33 (59%) out of 56 mergers are 
high overlap mergers, whereas 4 (7%) cases are medium overlap and 19 (34%) 
cases are low overlap mergers. 
ii) Method of Payment Subsamples:  The method of payment of financing is 
frequently cited as important to the ultimate success of mergers. The effect of 
method of payment is analyzed by dividing total sample to three subsets based 
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on the form of payment. The first subset is called equity-financed and includes 
cases where only the acquirer’s common stock was used to pay for an 
acquisition. The second subset is called cash-financed and includes cases 
where only cash was used for payment. The third subset is called mixed-
financed and includes all other cases in which the payment terms were neither 
pure stock nor pure cash. In some cases, both stock and cash were used and in 
other cases cash and senior securities were used. Sample analysis show that 33 
(59%) out of 56 mergers are equity-financed mergers, whereas 12 (21%) cases 
are cash-financed and 11 (20%) cases are mixed-financed.  
iii) Value-Growth Subsamples:  Theoretical financial literature suggest that 
companies with high price to book ratios (‘growth’ firms) are more likely to 
overestimate their own abilities to manage an acquisition and motivated by 
hubris (Rau and Vermaelen (1995)). Therefore, the takeovers by growth firms 
destroy shareholder value. On the other hand, companies with low price to 
book ratios (‘value’ firms) are more prudent before approving acquisitions. 
Since these acquisitions are not motivated by hubris, they should create 
shareholder value. I rank the mergers into separate subsamples based on 
bidders’ price to book ratio relative to their industries’ price to book ratio at 
the beginning of the year of merger announcement. Bidder companies’ price to 
book ratio is compared to the industry’s median price to book ratio in the 
beginning of the year prior to announcement. If bidder companies’ price to 
book ratio is higher than industry’s median price to book ratio book, the 
merger case is classified as ‘growth’ merger, otherwise as “value” merger. As 
a result of this ranking, 17 (30%) mergers appeared to be ‘value’ mergers and 
39 (70%) bidders as ‘growth’ mergers. 
iv) Combined Size Subsamples: I also examine whether the combined size of 
bidder and target influences postmerger performance of the surviving firm, I 
divide total sample to two different subsets according to combined size of the 
bidder and targets. Combined size is calculated as sum of bidder and target 
firms in the beginning of the year prior to announcement. Total assets are 
calculated by summing market value of equity and book value of total debt and 
preferred stock. I classify mergers as “larger” and “smaller” according to their 
size relative to the median for all firms in the sample. If the combined size of 
merger is greater than or equal to the calculated median, the merger case is 
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classified as a larger merger, otherwise as a smaller merger.  Since merger 
cases are ranked relative to their median, both subsets have an equal number 
(28 mergers) merger cases.  
 
3.2. Empirical Results and Discussion 
I present my empirical results in table 2. In accordance with research predictions, 
industry-adjusted ROE increases significantly after merger. The industry-adjusted mean 
(median) increase in ROE after merger is 2 percentage points (3 percent) and 59 percent of all 
firms experience increasing ROE after merger. The Wilcoxon test statistics is significant at 
the 10 percent level2. This result suggests that mergers create synergy.  
Interesting pattern is observed across subsamples. High overlap, cash-financed and 
smaller merger subsamples show significantly positive cash flow improvements, whereas 
cash flow changes are positive, but not statistically significant for remaining subsamples. The 
percentage of firms that experienced increasing industry-adjusted ROE is 61 percent in high 
overlap, 58 percent in cash-financed, 63 percent in smaller merger subsamples. 
The empirical results of this section is directly comparable and in the same line with that 
of Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992). They examine the post-acquisition operating 
performance of merged firms using a sample of the 50 largest mergers between U.S. public 
industrial firms completed in the period 1979 to mid-1984 and find that there are significant 
improvements in operating cash flow returns after the merger.  
 
                                                 
2 Since my hypothesis is unidirectional, I use one-tailed statistical tests.   
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TABLE 2 
Postmerger Performance Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Full Sample of Mergers 
This table presents empirical results for my full sample and subsamples. For each empirical proxy I give the number of usable observation, the mean and median values, 
standard deviation of the proxy for the three-year periods prior and subsequent to merger, the mean and median change in the proxy’s value for postmerger versus premerger 
period, and a test of significance of the change in median values. The final two columns detail the percentage of firms whose proxy values change as predicted, as well as a test 
of significance of this change. 
Variables N (Median) 
Premerger 
Mean  
Premerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Postmerger 
Mean  
(Median) 
Postmerger 
Standard 
Deviation 
Median 
Change 
(Mean) 
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
(Pre- and post- 
merger) 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted 
Z-Statistics for 
Significance of 
Proportion 
Change 
Full Sample           
Return on Equity (ROE) 54 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.08       
       
       
       
       
      
         
          
       
      
       
       
       
          
          
0.05
(0.04) 
0.13 0.03
(0.02) 
1.31* 0.59 0.68
Subsets According to  
Business Overlap of Merging Firms  
High Overlap 31 0.04 
(0.02) 
0.08 0.08
(0.04) 
0.15 0.04
(0.02) 
1.33* 0,61 1.08
Medium Overlap 4 -0.05 
(-0.04) 
0.08 0.08
(0.06) 
0.12 0.13
(0.10) 
1.47 0.75 0.50
Low Overlap 19 0.02 
(0.01) 
0.08 0.01
(0.01) 
0.09 -0.01
(0.00) 
0.36 0.53 0.00
Subsets According to Method  of Payment  
 
 
Cash 12 0.05
(0.06) 
0.1 0.17
(0.10) 
0.22 0.12
(0.04) 
1.57* 0.58 0.29
Mixed 10 -0.01
(0.02) 
0.06 0.03
(0.02) 
0.06 0.04
(0.00) 
1.58* 0.80 1.58*
Equity  32 0.02 
(0.01) 
  
0.08 0.02
(0.03) 
 
0.08 0.00
(0.02) 
0.15 0.47 0.53
Subsets According To Relative 
Price-To-Book Ratio Of Bidders  
“Value” Bidders  16 0.06 
(0.03) 
0.10 0.12
(0.06) 
0.21 0.06
(0.03) 
1.19 0.63 0.75
“Growth” Bidders 38 0.01 
(0.01) 
  
0.07 0.02
(0.03) 
0.07 0.01
(0.02) 
0.78 0.58 0.81
Subsets According to Relative Size 
Small 27 0.04
(0.02) 
0.09 0.08
(0.04) 
0.17 0.04
(0.02) 
1.47* 0.63 1.15
Big 27 0.01
(0.01) 
0.06 0.02
(0.03) 
0.10 0.01
(0.02) 
0.26 0.56 0.38
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.  
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IV.  MARKET REACTION TO MERGER ANNOUNCEMENTS  
In this section, I examine the market reaction to the merger announcements which may 
provide an insight about the market’s expectations of merger’s success.  
 
4.1. Methodology 
The information content of a merger event is measured as the abnormal common stock 
return relative to the aggregate market return. An estimate of the abnormal return of for 
security j on event day t  (t=0 is designated the event date) is defined as the market-model 
prediction error (PE): 
PEj t  = Rj t  – E(Rj t)    [1]  
where, 
Rj t  = market return of the securities over month t which is measured by summing close 
price at the end of the month t plus dividends per share within the month t, divided by the 
close price of the month (t-1). 
E(Rj t) = expected rate of return on security i for day t that is estimated using Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). CAPM is used to determine the expected rate of return for an 
asset at a given level of risk.  Essentially, expected rate of return for security j is calculated 
as: 
E(Rj t) =Rrf  +β(Rm t -  Rr f)    [2] 
where 
Rr f  =   risk free rate (measured by 3 month USA Treasury bill rate)  
Rm t  =   market return (measured by return of the Standard & Poor's 500 Index) 
β   =  sensitivity of a company's stock price to the overall fluctuation in the 
   market return  
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To determine the market reaction for acquirers and targets to the merger announcements, 
I calculate monthly cumulative abnormal returns for announcement month of the merger. 
Since Compustat retains 5-year market data, in order to test for market efficiency, I had to 
select mergers announced later than June 1995 which resulted in the sample size of 37 
mergers.  
 
4.2. Empirical Results and Discussion 
Table 3 reports the abnormal returns in the merger process over one-month event 
window. Consistent with previous researches, target firms experience large abnormal returns. 
The average (median) abnormal return for the targets is 19 percentage points (19 percent). 
The t-statistics is significant at 1 percent significance level. I also found that bidder firms 
experience positive, but not statistically significant abnormal returns. Combined abnormal 
return, which is calculated by weighting the target and bidder returns by their relative sizes in 
the beginning of the year of announcement, is significantly positive.  The average (median) 
abnormal combined return is 7 percentage points (5 percent) and 70 percent of all mergers 
experience positive combined abnormal returns. The t-statistics is significant at 5 percent 
significance level. Subsample analyses show that target shareholders abnormal returns and 
combined returns are significantly positive abnormal returns across all subsamples3, whereas 
bidder shareholders’ abnormal returns are not statistically different from zero. These results 
suggest that financial markets react favorably to mergers and mergers create value. The value 
is created, not transferred, since significant abnormal returns to targets do not come at the 
expense of bidder shareholders. 
The research findings in this section are in the same line with the previous researches 
which provide empirical evidence that shareholders of target firms realize large positive 
abnormal returns in completed mergers. The evidence on the rewards to bidding firms is 
mixed, but the weight of the evidence suggests that zero returns earned by successful bidding 
firms in mergers. Since targets gain and bidders do not appear to lose, the evidence suggests 
that mergers create value (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Nathan and O’Keefe, 1989; Desai and 
Kim, 1988; Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1983). 
                                                 
3 Since case numbers of cash and mixed-financed mergers are less than 10, I haven’t conducted statistical 
significance tests for these subsamples. 
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TABLE 3 
Summary of Results from Tests of Abnormal Returns for the Full and Subsamples of Mergers 
This table presents empirical results for my full sample of mergers. For each empirical proxy I give the number of 
usable observation, the mean and median values, and standard deviation of the proxy for the three-year periods prior 
and subsequent to merger, and a test of significance of abnormal returns. The final two columns detail the percentage 
of firms whose abnormal returns are positive, as well as a test of significance of this ratio. Significance levels for 
subsets with total number of cases less than 10 are not reported. 
Variables N 
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return 
Median 
Abnormal 
Return 
t-statistics 
 
Total Sample      
Target 37 0.19 0.19 5.87*** 
Bidder 37 0.05 0.01 1.25 
Combined 37 0.07 0.05 2.16** 
Subsets According to Business Overlap 
of Merging Firms     
  High Overlap      
Target 21 0.14 0.19 3.34*** 
Bidder 21 0.08 0.04 1.16 
Combined 21 0.09 0.06 1.54 
  Low and Medium Overlap      
Target 16 0.25 0.22 5.41*** 
Bidder 16 0.01 0.01 0.57 
Combined 16 0.05 0.05 2.35** 
Subsets According to Method 
 of Payment     
  Cash-Financed      
Target 9 0.27 0.32 1.32 
Bidder 9 0.17 0.03 1.09 
Combined 9 0.17 0.05 1.39 
  Mixed-Financed      
Target 5 0.20 0.19 4.80 
Bidder 5 -0.02 0.00 0.43 
Combined 5 0.04 0.03 1.39 
 Equity –Financed     
Target 23 0.16 0.19 3.85*** 
Bidder 23 0.02 0.01 0.87 
Combined 23 0.04 0.06 1.71* 
Subsets According To Relative 
Price-To-Book Ratio Of Bidders     
  “Value”      
Target 11 0.25 0.22 5.45*** 
Bidder 11 0.16 0.04 1.27 
Combined 11 0.16 0.08 1.61 
  “Growth”      
Target 26 0.17 0.18 4.00*** 
Bidder 26 0.00 0.01 0.19 
Combined 26 0.03 0.05 1.70* 
Subsets According to Relative Size     
  Large      
Target 24 0.20 0.20 5.51*** 
Bidder 24 0.01 0.00 0.93 
Combined 24 0.04 0.04 2.69*** 
  Small      
Target 13 0.18 0.19 2.67*** 
Bidder 13 0.12 0.02 1.06 
Combined 13 0.13 0.08 1.42 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using two-tailed test. 
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V. RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN ABNORMAL RETURNS AT MERGER 
 ANNOUNCEMENTS AND POSTMERGER CASH FLOW CHANGES  
If stock markets are efficient, it is logical to expect positive correlation between bidder 
abnormal returns in the announcement period and postmerger performance improvements. 
Markets should react positively to bidders’ shares, if they expect cash flow improvements, 
otherwise not. 
 
5.1. Methodology  
I use simple regression analysis to test relationship between abnormal stock returns at 
the merger announcement and postmerger cash flow improvements. Since I test whether 
abnormal stock returns at the merger announcement predict correctly postmerger cash flows, 
ROE is dependent, and abnormal return is an independent variable.  
 
5.2. Empirical Results and Discussion 
Regression analysis results are reported in Table 4. Full sample analysis yield strong 
results in favor of market efficiency. It appears that bidder abnormal returns are strong 
predictor of industry-adjusted postmerger cash flow changes. The estimated model has an R2 
of 66%. The estimated slope coefficient on stock returns at the merger announcement is 
0.47% and is statistically reliable at 1 percent levels.  
An interesting finding is the weak and not statistically significant positive correlation 
between target’s stock returns at the merger announcement and postmerger cash flow 
changes. The R2 is only 2 percent. This result implies that target abnormal returns do not bear 
valuable information content about postmerger cash flow changes. 
Subsample analyses do not uniformly support the market efficiency hypothesis. 
Abnormal bidder stock returns at the merger announcement is the good predictor of 
postmerger cash flow changes n high overlap, cash and mixed financed, value and smaller 
merger subsamples. The explained variability of postmerger cash flow changes by bidder 
abnormal stock returns range from 76% to 87%. 
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TABLE 4 
Relationship Between Median Postmerger Industry-Adjusted Cash Flow Changesa  and Short-Term 
Abnormal Returnsb for Full Sample 
This table presents my empirical results for my full sample of mergers. For each regression analysis I give 
the regression equation, t-values, R2, F-statistics and number of usable observations.  
PANEL A: Full Sample Analysis (t-values in parentheses) 
ROEdiff,i = -0.1% + 0.47%  ARbidder,i 
                                                  (-0.05)    (8.16)c Relation between bidder abnormal returns 
and industry-adjusted cash flow changes R2=0.66, F-Statistics=66.6c, N=36 
ROEdiff,i =0.3%  + 0.10% ARtarget,i 
                                                  (0.09)    (0.84) Relation between target abnormal returns 
and industry-adjusted cash flow changes R2=0.02, F-Statistics=0.7, N=36 
PANEL B: Subsample Analysis (t-values in parentheses) 
ROEdiff,i = 0.3% + 0.50%  ARbidder,i 
                                                  (0.15)    (7.50)a High Overlap Mergers 
R2=0.76, F-Statistics=55.9a, N=20 
ROEdiff,i = -0.1% - 0.30%  ARbidder,i 
                                                  (-0.04)    (-1.39) Low and Medium Overlap Mergers 
R2=0.12, F-Statistics=1.93, N=16 
ROEdiff,i = 2.3% + 0.54%  ARbidder,i 
                                                  (-0.91)    (8.40)a Cash and Mixed Financed Mergers 
R2=0.87, F-Statistics=70.5a, N=13 
ROEdiff,i = -0.7% - 0.04%  ARbidder,i  
                                                  (-0.57)    (-0.38) Equity Financed Mergers 
R2=0.00, F-Statistics=0.15, N=23 
ROEdiff,i = -0.2% + 0.54%  ARbidder,i 
                                                  (-0.05)    (6.90)a Value Mergers 
R2=0.84, F-Statistics=47.6a, N=11 
ROEdiff,i = -0.5% - 0.10%  ARbidder,i 
                                                  (-0.43)    (-1.17) Growth Mergers 
R2=0.06, F-Statistics=1.37, N=25 
ROEdiff,i = -1.0% - 0.20%  ARbidder,i 
                                                  (-0.86)    (-1.16) Larger Mergers 
R2=0.06, F-Statistics=1.36, N=23 
ROEdiff,i = 2.5% + 0.49%  ARbidder,i 
                                                  (0.80)    (6.39)a Smaller Mergers 
R2=0.79 F-Statistics=40.8a, N=13 
a Cash flow returns are median industry-adjusted return on equity which is the earnings before tax, interest expenses, and  
depreciations divided by the market value of equity in the beginning of the year. 
b Short-Term Abnormal Returns are the abnormal common stock return in excess of the expected rate of return of 
security.  
c Significantly different from zero at the 1% level, using a two-tailed test.  
d Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, using a two-tailed test.  
Abnormal bidder stock returns at the merger announcement fails to predict postmerger 
cash flow changes in remaining subsamples. The regression model and slope coefficients are 
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not significant for low and medium overlap, equity-financed, growth and larger merger 
subsamples.  In these subsamples, the coefficient of determination ranges from 0% to 12%. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Financial markets are assumed to be efficient in that asset prices reflect all information 
about individual firms. If the market evaluates managerial decisions in a reasonable way 
based on their effect on fundamental value, significant positive correlation is assumed 
between abnormal returns in the announcement period and postmerger performance 
improvements.  
My findings provide partial support for the market efficiency hypothesis. The bidder 
abnormal return at the announcement period is a good predictor of the postmerger cash flow 
improvements. Target’s abnormal returns at the announcement period are apparently 
determined by other factors rather than market’s expectations about the success of mergers.  
Though, the market efficiency hypothesis is supported by full sample analysis, the 
subsample analysis of market efficiency hypothesis cast strong doubts to market efficiency. 
Apparently, bidder abnormal return is an excellent predictor of postmerger performance 
improvements in high overlap, cash and mixed financed, value and smaller mergers, whereas 
it fails to predict postmerger performance improvements in low and medium overlap, equity 
financed, growth and larger mergers. The failure of abnormal returns in the announcement 
period to predict postmerger performance improvements in the half of the subsamples suggest 
that markets do not react properly to the information content of bid process and it may hint to 
the serious market imperfections. 
The violation of the market efficiency hypothesis in the half of the subsamples can be 
explained within asymmetric information framework. Since the market do not have an access 
to the private valuation of bidder and targets in the merger process, they utilize dynamic 
clichés such as method of payment, business overlap of merging firms and value-growth 
category of bidding firms as a signal about the success of merger. However, these dynamic 
clichés may incorporate misleading information content which may lead the market to the 
improper reactions as we found in our analysis. 
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